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I.

Introduction

Calls of in-the-moneyconvertible securities are
reexaminedin light of a short-runliquidity cost
explanation of observed price behavior. In the
scenariodescribedbelow the announcementof a
conversion-forcingcall heralds the beginningof
a period of abnormallyhigh sell-ordervolume in
the callingfirm's common stock. Marketdealers
respond to the order imbalances by lowering
prices to deter sellers and attract buyers. Thus,
observed negative stock price reactions to call
announcementscontain a transitorycomponent
reflectingthe price of liquidityin the capitalmarkets. The evidence we report is broadly consistent with predictions related to the liquidity explanationfor stock price reactions to convertible
bond calls and is partiallyconsistent for calls of
convertiblepreferredstocks.
The liquidityhypothesis presentedbelow joins
several other possible explanationsfor observed
* For valuable suggestions and criticisms, we thank David
P. Brown and Robert Jennings of Indiana University; Robert
Hansen of Virginia Polytechnic Institute; Steve Mann, Rodney Roenfeldt, and Neil Sicherman of the University of South
Carolina; Vikram Pandit of Morgan Stanley; and Greg Gavin,
Bob Seijas, and Jack Siegel of the New York Stock Exchange. We are particularly grateful for detailed guidance
from an anonymous referee and to Doug Diamond, and we
thank Michele Bergen for expert editorial assistance.
(Journal of Business, 1992, vol. 65, no. 3)
? 1992 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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Firms' announcements
to call in-the-money
convertible securities
for redemption essentially force their conversion into common
stock, and such announcements are generally met with significant reductions in the
calling firms' equity
values. An explanation
based on liquidity costs
is advanced and tested.
The explanation implies that investors
who choose to sell
their shares early in the
conversion period bear
liquidity costs by selling at reduced prices.
Consistent with the explanation, the average
share price decline is
short-lived, lasting
most of the conversion
period. Thus, a component of the call announcement effect appears to be due to
liquidity costs.
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negative stock price reactions to calls of in-the-money convertible
bonds and preferredstocks (Mikkelson 1981, 1985;Mais, Moore, and
Rogers 1989). Mikkelson (1985) finds evidence that lost interest tax
shields due to calling convertible bonds account for at least some of
the negative announcementeffect. However, this explanationcannot
extend to the negative effects of calls of convertible preferredstocks
because preferreddividends do not provide tax shields. Information
signalingis suggested as a theoreticalexplanationby Harrisand Raviv
(1985) for (1) the adverse stock price effects and (2) the reality that
convertible bond calls are typically delayed until the convertibles are
substantiallyin the money (Ingersoll 1977b).1Their model has found
empirical support in the evidence reported by Ofer and Natarajan
(1987), though some of their most persuasive evidence is shown to be
critically sensitive to the choice of estimation period for the returngenerating process used in their study (Cowan, Nayar, and Singh
1990).Moreover, the predictionsof the model set forth by Harrisand
Raviv (1985) do not extend in an obvious way to calls of convertible
preferredstocks, though perhaps a signaling argumentcan be made
that would explain the negative price effect observed for these securities as well.
Thoughno single explanationset forth so far has found general support across differenttypes of security calls, negative stock price reactions to call announcementsrepresentan empiricalregularitythat may
be partially explained by short-runliquidity costs. A liquidity-based
explanationof stock price behavior aroundcalls of convertible bonds
and preferredstocks is set forth in Section II. Evidence of negative
equity valuationeffects due to calls of both types of convertiblesecurities is reported in Section III, and stock price behavior before and
after the announcementperiod also is examined in that section. For
our combined sample of 169 calls of convertible bonds and preferred
stocks, we find a significantnegative averageabnormalreturnof about
1.9%for the 2-day announcementperiod, consistent with the negative
effects documentedby Mikkelson(1981)for convertiblebond calls and
by Mais, Moore, and Rogers (1989) for convertible preferred stock
calls. For the periodfollowing announcementendingon the last day on
1. In perfect capital markets with zero call notice period, Ingersoll (1977a) and Brennan and Schwartz (1977, 1980) show that the optimal policy is to call when stock value
just equals the effective call price, i.e., the stated call price plus accrued interest. An
alternative explanation for delayed calls is set forth by Constantinides and Grundy
(1987). If calling is costly, the firm will rationally delay if voluntary conversion by
the convertible security holders is anticipated. Jaffee and Shleifer (1990) offer another
explanation for delayed calls based on avoidance of financial distress. Given a positive
call notice period, the firm will rationally wait until a convertible security is well in the
money to minimize the chance that it will be out of the money by the call date. If the
security goes out of the money, the firm is faced with redeeming for cash a large security
issue, and this may lead to financial distress.
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which conversion is possible, we find a significantpositive cumulative
average abnormalreturnof about 2.2%, suggestingthat a component
of the announcementeffect is transitory. Tests of the liquidity-based
explanation are reported in Section IV. We show that stock prices
rebound significantly following announcements of convertible bond
calls. That is, those stocks that decline the most upon announcement
tend to regain the most duringthe period of conversion. No evidence
of reboundingfollowing calls of convertiblepreferredstocks is found.
The combined findingsare interpretedand summarizedin Section V.
II.

Liquidity Effects of Calls of Convertible Securities

Short-runliquiditycosts may arise in "the form of an explicit commission or a price away from the equilibriumprice" (Krausand Stoll 1972,
p. 571). Liquiditycosts due to prices set away from equilibriumhave
been detected in the case of block trades by Krausand Stoll (1972), in
new equity issues via general cash offers by Barclay and Litzenberger
(1988),and for equity issue via rightsoffers by Hansen (1988). Liquidity costs in the form of explicit dealer compensationas measuredby
the bid-ask spread are detected for secondary equity distributionsby
Mikkelsonand Partch (1985). In hypothesizingthe behavior of stock
prices aroundconvertiblecalls, we follow Krausand Stoll (1972),Mikkelson and Partch (1985), and others in recognizingthat increases in
supply may lead to long-termprice effects due to less than perfectly
elastic demand, or short-termeffects due to liquiditycosts.
A conversion-forcingcall in our scenario marks the beginningof a
period of accelerated trading that is largely seller initiated.2Rather
than holding newly converted shares as permanentadditions to their
portfolios, holders of called convertibles may decide to liquidate the
shares. The decision to liquidatemay be based on differencesin yields
and capital gains potential between the convertibles and underlying
shares, leading to changes in tax liability. If the investor is an institution such as a bank, there may be regulatoryor policy requirements
that dictate rebalancingof the portfolio after conversion. Because the
market value of the convertible will be very close to its conversion
value after the call announcement,the decision to convert, then sell
the shares, or to sell the convertible security directly, will rest on
relative brokeragefees and perhaps the relative speed with which the
convertibles and the shares can be liquidated.
In response to an in-the-moneycall, marketmakers(specialists) adjust bid and ask prices to deter sellers and attractbuyers. If sell orders
2. During the week of the call announcement, trading volume in our data set increases
by an average of 44% for bond calls and 38% for preferred calls relative to average
weekly volume before the announcement.
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are not reduced sufficiently, or buy orders are not increased sufficiently by the price change, dealers must temporarilyabsorb some of
the shares. For compensationfor providingliquidity, a dealer should
lower bid and ask quotes so that transaction prices are below the
new long-runequilibrium.3In this scenario, we are casting convertible
securitycalls as "liquidityevents" in the sense describedby Grossman
and Miller (1988), and dealers' responses are consistent with various
models of dealer marketsunder conditions of inventory risk (Garman
1976;Stoll 1978;Ho and Stoll 1981;and O'Haraand Oldfield1986).
If forced conversion leads to portfolio-rebalancingbehavior as we
have described,the call announcementwill be followed by a protracted
period of high sell-order volume unless bid and ask quotes are kept
low to deter sellers and attract buyers. We do not know how many
trades are due to rebalancing, and we cannot pin down when such
tradingtakes place in the aftermathof a forced conversion. But the
scenario is rich enough to allow us to predict that investors who sell
early in the process will do so at lower prices than those willing to
wait. Thus, call announcementsshould result in immediatestock price
reductionsbelow long-runequilibrium,and prices will begin to recover
thereafter, continuing until the demand for immediacy by sellers is
diminished.
This scenario brings us to view a conversion-forcingcall as similar
to issuance of new common stock via a rightsofferingin which current
shareholdersreceive the right to purchase additionalshares, usually
at a discount. When the rights are exercised the shareholderswill then
have more shares in their portfolios, and they may wish to sell some
in order to rebalance. The effect is a price decline duringa temporary
period of selling, and a price recovery therafter.The price decline is
to entice buyers to provideimmediacyto sellers, and the loss in portfolio value suffered by the sellers (originalshareholders)represents an
additionalcost of marketingthe shares. This is the scenario presented
by Hansen (1988), and it appears to go far in resolving a long-standing paradox in finance.4Under the scenario presented above, a conversion-forcingcall also passes some of the task of marketingnewly
issued common shares to security holders, in this case, convertible
bondholdersand preferredstockholders.
All of the convertible securities examined in this study are issued
3. The quoted spread is the set of bid and ask prices quoted by the specialist and
represents the realized spread only if the specialist could execute a buy and a sell
order simultaneously. The realized spread (Stoll 1989), or effective spread (Roll 1984),
represents the difference between proximate buy and sell transaction prices.
4. The paradox, summarized by Brealey and Myers (1991, pp. 359-60), is that underwritten general cash offers are more expensive than nonunderwritten rights offers in the
United States, but firms rely predominantly on underwritten general cash offers to market securities.
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by firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange or, in a few cases,
the American Stock Exchange. These exchanges feature continuous
auctionmarketswith single dealers (specialists) appointedto maintain
liquidmarketsfor specified securities. The liquidity-basedexplanation
for stock price behavioraroundcalls of convertiblespredicts a decline
in stock price upon announcement.This is the same prediction,at least
for convertible bonds, that arises from the asymmetric information
model of Harris and Raviv (1985) and the lost tax shield explanation
supportedby Mikkelson (1985). Thus, the liquidityexplanationis not
set forth as an exclusive alternativeto other explanations. It supplements these in suggestingthat a component of the announcementperiod price reactionwill be transitory,while not rulingout a permanent
price change as well.
III.

Stock Price Behavior Surrounding Security Calls

A. Sample Selection

The preliminarysample of calls of convertiblebonds was identifiedin
annual editions of Moody's Industrial Manual. Redemptions of pre-

ferred stocks are not identifiedin Moody's, thus the preliminarysample was identifiedby first isolatingfirmsthat had convertiblepreferred
stock outstandingaccording to Standardand Poor's Compustatdata
base. Firms that reduced the amount of outstandingconvertible preferred duringa given year were selected as candidates.
The preliminarysamples were subjected to the screening criteria
enumeratedbelow; the final samples consist of 111 convertible bond
calls and 58 convertible preferredcalls:5
1. The calling firm's daily rates of return on common stock surroundingthe redemptiondate must be availableon the Centerfor
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) Daily Returns File. This
requirementeffectively limits the sample to only those firmsthat
have theircommon stock listed on eitherthe New York or American stock exchange. In addition,each conmmonstock is required
to have at least 100daily returnsrecordedin the CRSPfile during
each of the estimationperiods described in the next section.
2. An unambiguousfirst public announcementof the call decision
appearedin the Wall Street Journal, and the announcementwas
the only firm-specificnews item on that date, or at any time
duringthe period from 2 days before to 2 days after that date.
5. Though the sample selection criteria differ slightly, this should not pose a problem
for inferences drawn from the analysis. The tests are performed on the combined sample
and on each subsample independently.
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TABLE 1

Percentage Increases in Common Shares and Length of Conversion
Periods for Calls of Convertible Bonds and Preferred Stocks

Percentage increase in
common shares:
Mean
Range
Length of conversion
period (in days):
Mean
Range

Convertible Bond
Calls
(N = 111)

Convertible Preferred
Calls
(N = 58)

13.2
1.0-15.3

12.8
.1-36.6

27.5
16-60

26.5
14-56

3. The effective call date, the last day by which the bonds could be
converted, was available.
4. The conversion value of the called security exceeded the call
price at the time of call; thus the calls are made in the money.
In table 1, descriptive statistics are presented for the two samples.
The calls of convertiblebonds and preferredstocks representrelatively
large increases in common shares outstandingupon conversion. The
average ratio of the actual numberof shares issued due to conversion
to the number of shares outstandingbefore conversion is 13.2%for
the bonds and 12.8%for the preferredstocks. These average values
are close to the ratios reported by Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and
Asquith and Mullins (1986)for new issues of common equity.
The length of time between public announcementand the end of the
conversion period averages 27.5 tradingdays for bonds and 26.5 trading days for preferredstocks. The length of time varies from 16 to 60
tradingdays for bonds and from 14 to 56 days for preferredstocks;
thus there is substantialvariabilityin the notice periods stipulatedby
the call provisions.
B.

Measurement of Abnormal Returns

We measure abnormal returns and assess statistical significance of
various cross-sectional averages of those returns using the market
model primarilyand supplementthe analysis with the mean-adjusted
returnsmodel estimated over identical estimationperiods. The abnormal return (ARi) based on the market model for security j during
period t is given by equation (1):
ARjt = Rjt - (&

+

3jRmt),

(1)
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where
Rjt= rate of returnof securityj, inclusive of dividends,over day t;
Rmt= rate of returnon the CRSPequal-weightedindex, over day t;
pj = regressionparameterestimates.
Parameterestimates (aj, 1?)are calculatedby ordinaryleast squares.
Two different 180-dayestimationperiods were chosen in order to determine if the findings are sensitive to the choice. We define the
before-event estimation period as that beginning with t = - 360 and
ending on t = - 181 relative to the announcement date (AD). Before-

event estimation was used by Ofer and Natarajan(1987). We define
the after-event estimation period as that from t = + 181 to t = + 360

relative to the last day the security can be converted, the conversion
ending date (CED), plus 20 days. After-event estimation is used by
Mikkelson(1981)and by Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991)and is justified given the evidence from Mikkelson(1981)and Cowan, Nayar, and
Singh (1990) that security calls follow a period of positive abnormal
price behavior; thus, preevent estimation may lead to biased predictions in equation (1).
The cross-sectional average abnormalreturn(AAR) for day t is calculated as in equation (2):
N

1/N3

AARt=

(2)

AR1t.
j=1

In equation(2), N denotes sample size. The cumulativeaverageabnormal return(CAAR) for days aj to bj is given by equation (3):
N

CAARa,b

=

bi

1IN

(3)

3ARit.
j=1 t= aj

The abnormalreturn(ARjt)in equation(1) is a regressionprediction
error, thus its standardizedform is given by equation (4):
SARjt = ARjtlSj,

(4)

where
ED

|

Si

+

1

ED

+

(Rmt

<1/2
k2
-R)

ED

3(Rmi-

15
Rm)2
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In equation (5), 6-Jis the mean square errorof the marketmodel, ED
is the number of days in the estimation period, and Rmdenotes the
sample mean return on the CRSP equal-weightedindex during the
estimationperiod.
Over the interval aj to bj, the cross-sectional average cumulative
standardizedabnormalreturn(ACSAR) is given by equation (6):
N

1IN I

ACSARa,b =

bj

SARjt/ Vb, - aj + 1.

(6)

j=1 t=aj

Assumingnormalityof ARjt,with ARjtindependentof ARkt,j # k, and
with ARjtindependentof ARj,, s # t, the following test statistic is a
unit normalrandomvariable:6
Z

C.

=

7N(ACSARa,b)

(7)

Stock Price Behavior around Call Announcements

In table 2, we present cumulativedaily averageabnormalreturns(from
eq. [3]), test statistics (from eq. [7]), and the numbersof positive and
negative observations for various periods of time relative to the announcement calling for the redemptionof an outstandingconvertible
security. The results in table 2, panel A, were generated using the
after-event estimation period, t = + 181 to t = + 360, relative to
CED+ 20, while those in table 2, panel B, are based on the beforeevent estimation period, t = - 360 to t = - 181, relative to AD.

In table 2, panels A and B, results for the combined sample are
presented in column 1, the convertible bonds in column 2, and the
convertible preferred stocks in column 3. Price behavior before the
announcementdate (AD) duringthe period AD-60 to AD-2 is similar
for the combined sample, the bonds only, and the preferred stocks
only, regardlessof the choice of estimationperiod. In all cases, there
is a statistically significantpositive CAAR, rangingfrom .047 (Z =
3.319) for bonds only, using before-event estimation, to .094 (Z =
4.387) for preferredstocks only, using after-eventestimation. For the
full sample, using after-eventestimation, 119 observations have positive cumulativeabnormalreturns(CARs)comparedto 50 with negative
CARs.7 The preannouncementrun-up reaffirmsthat documented by
Mikkelson(1981).
6. Since the same point estimates of the market model parameters are used to calculate all of the elements of the time series of abnormal returns for a given security, the
independence of AR,, and ARjs, s $z t, may not hold. The abnormal return series for
each security was tested for first-order autocorrelation, and in only six cases out of the
combined sample of 169 securities was the correlation estimate significant at the 5%
level.
7. The probability of drawing at least 119 positive CARs in a sample of 169 given that
positive and negative CARs are equally probable is less than .001.
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Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) for Selected Intervals
Surrounding Convertible Security Calls
Combined Sample
(N = 169)
(1)

Interval

Convertible Bonds
(N = 111)
(2)

Convertible
Preferred Stocks
(N = 58)
(3)

A. Market Model Parameters from After-Event Estimation Period
AD-60 to AD-2:
CAAR
t-statistic
pos/neg CARs
AD-1 to AD:
CAAR
t-statistic
pos/neg CARs
AD+i toCED:
CAAR
t-statistic
pos/neg CARs
CED + I to CED + 20:
CAAR
t-statistic
pos/neg CARs
AD+ I to CED + 20:
CAAR
t-statistic
pos/neg CARs

.090
(6.838)
119/50

.088
(5.268)
77/34

.094
(4.387)
42/16

-.018

-.012

-.015

(- 8.740)

(- 7.484)

(- 5.863)

44/125

28/83

16/42

.022
(2.717)
108/61

.022
(2.044)
69/42

.022
(1.805)
39/19

.001
(.169)
85/84

.004
(.358)
58/53

(- .198)

.022
(2.119)
94/75

.026
(1.717)
61/50

.016
(1.249)
33/25

.005
27/31

B. Market Model Parameters from Before-Event Estimation Period
AD-60 to AD-2:
CAAR
t-statistic
pos/neg CARs
AD-1 to AD:
CAAR
t-statistic
pos/neg CARs
AD+ Ito CED:
CAAR
t-statistic
pos/neg CARs
CED + I to CED + 20:
CAAR
t-statistic
pos/neg CARs
AD+ I to CED + 20:
CAAR
t-statistic
pos/neg CARs

.052
(4.353)
107/62

.047
(3.319)
70/44

.064
(3.073)
37/21

-.019

-.021

(- 9.420)

(- 7.639)

43/123

26/85

.004
(1.348)
95/74

.002
(.653)
63/48

-.012
(- 1.866)
78/91

-.013
(- 1.601)
50/61

-.010
(-.951)
28/30

-.008
(-.234)
82/87

-.012
(-.632)
53/58

-.000
(-.476)
29/29

-.015
(-5.514)
17/41
.010
(1.397)
32/26

NOTE.-The announcementdate is denoted by AD; CED denotes day conversion ends. The
designationpos/neg CARS = numberof positive cumulativeabnormalreturns(CARs)/numberof
negativeCARs.
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The 2-day announcement-periodresults are also consistent across
samples and for both estimation periods. For the combined sample
using before-event estimation (table 2, panel B), the CAAR is -.019
(Z = - 9.420), and using after-event estimation (table 2, panel A), the
CAAR is - .018 (Z = - 8.740). For the full sample, using after-event

estimation,44 CARs are positive comparedto 125negative CARs. The
probabilityof drawinga sample of at least 125 negative CARs is less
than .0001 (see n. 6 above). Thus, there is evidence of a significant
negative average price reaction to calls of convertible securities, regardless of the choice of estimation period, and the result extends to
the subsamplesof bonds and preferredstocks. The findingof a negative valuation effect for convertible bond calls is consistent with the
results of Mikkelson (1981, 1985), Ofer and Natarajan (1987), and
Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991). The negative wealth effect for convertiblepreferredcalls reaffirmsthe findingof Mais, Moore, and Rogers (1989).
In each of the panels of table 2, CAAR values are also reportedfor
the periodfollowingannouncementto the day conversion ends (AD + 1
through CED), the 20-day period following the day conversion ends
(CED+1 through CED + 20), and the total period AD +1 through
CED + 20. Use of after-eventestimation(table 2, panel A) reveals significantpositive averageabnormalreturnsduringAD + 1 throughCED
for the combinedsampleas well as for each subsample.The full sample
exhibits a CAAR of .022, significantat the 1%level. Positive CARs
outnumbernegative CARs 108 to 61. Results are similarfor the convertible bonds and preferredstocks analyzed separately.8This finding
suggests that the negative announcementeffect is not entirely permanent and is consistent with the liquidity-basedexplanation.When the
period is extended to AD + 1 throughCED + 20, the CAAR for the full
sample (.022) is positive and significantat the 4% level (Z = 2.119).
The bond subsample CAAR is .026, significantat the 5% level (Z =
1.717) under the one-sided alternative. The result for the preferred
subsampleis weaker (CAAR = .016) and significantonly at the 11%
level (Z = 1.249) using a one-tailed test.
Stock price behaviorduringthe conversion period is describedvisually by graphingCAAR values beginningthe day following announcement (AD +1) and extending to AD + 30, approximatingthe average
intervalfrom announcementto the end of conversion. This is done in
figure1, panels a and b, for the convertiblebond calls and the convertible preferredstock calls, respectively. The patternsare quite similar
for the two types of security calls. In both cases, CAAR values appear
8. For the preferred calls subsample, CAAR = .022 and Z = 1.805, significant at the
4% level under the one-sided alternative. Positive CARs outnumber negative CARs 39
to 19; the probability of drawing at least 39 positive CARs in the sample is .006.
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FIG. 1.-Cumulative
average abnormal returns on common stocks for 30
trading days following calls of convertible bonds and convertible preferred
stocks; a, Convertible bond calls (N = 111); b, Convertible preferred stock
calls (N = 58).
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to be such that prices have recovered substantiallyby the end of the
approximateconversion period. The magnitudeof postannouncement
abnormal performance is particularly sensitive to whether preannouncement (table 2, panel B) or postannouncementreturns (table
2, panel A) are used to estimate the market model parameters.The
sensitivity of the results in the case of convertiblebond calls has been
pointed out by Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991) and
Cowan, Nayar, and Singh (1990), and the latter study suggests that the
use of preevent parameterestimates is biased.
Using preevent estimationfor the postannouncementanalysis (table
2, panel B) leads to weaker results. For the period AD+ 1 through
CED, the full samplehas a CAAR value of .004 (Z = 1.348), significant
at only the 9% level using a one-tailed test. However, positive CARs
outnumbernegative CARs 95 to 74; the probabilityof drawingat least
95 positive CARs in this sample is .045. The bond subsampleCAAR
(.002) is not significantat any reasonablelevel (Z = 0.653), while the
preferredsubsamplehas a CAAR value of .010, significantat the 8%
level (Z = 1.397).Positive CARs for the bond sampleoutnumbernegative CARs by 63 to 48, and for the preferredstock sample positive
CARs outnumbernegative CARs by 32 to 26.9Thus, even though the
parametricresults are weak because of the possible bias of preevent
parameterestimates, the nonparametricresults show modest support
for positive average abnormalprice performanceduringthe period of
conversion (AD + 1 to CED). All of the analyses and tests presented
in table 2 were repeated using the mean-adjustedreturnsmodel. The
results were parallel to those reported in table 2 for the combined,
convertiblebond, and preferredstock samplesfor both the after-event
andbefore-eventestimationperiods. Thus, the sensitivityof the results
is confined to the choice of estimation period, and not to the choice
of returngeneratingmodels.
Previous studies of convertible security calls that report abnormal
stock returns immediately subsequent to announcementvary as to
their conclusions. Mikkelson's (1981) data reveal positive cumulative
raw returns of .88% during the 30-day period following convertible
bond calls, and 1.05%for the same period following convertible preferredcalls. Campbell,Ederington,and Vankudre(1991)reportcumulative averageabnormalreturnsof 1.939%for the 40-dayperiodfollowing convertible bond calls using after-event estimation of the market
model. With before-event estimation they find a cumulative average
abnormalreturn of - 1.10%. Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991), using
after-eventestimationof the marketmodel, find a cumulativeaverage
abnormalreturn of 3.62%for the 60-day period following nonunder9. The probabilities of drawing at least 63 positive CARs in the bond sample and at
least 32 positive CARs in the preferred stock sample are .064 and .179, respectively.

365

Liquidity Costs

written calls of convertible bonds, though their findingis not statistically significant(Z = 1.09). For their sample of underwrittencalls,
they find a 4.26%cumulativeabnormalreturnthat is significantat the
8% level (Z = 1.75).10 The tests we have presented should be more

powerfultests of the conversion-periodprice behaviorbecause we use
the date conversion ends for each firm."
IV.

Tests of the Liquidity Hypotheses

To the extent that the negative price reaction on the announcement
date is due at least partiallyto selling pressure, a rebound should be
in evidence; that is, prices that decline the most should recover the
most. To examine this we follow Hansen (1988) and estimate the following model:
CARj,

],END =

0

+ 1ICARj,,,O+

Ej.

(8)

is the cumulative abnormalreturn for
security j during the period t = AD + 1 through t = CED, the end
of the conversion period, and CARj,- 1,0 is measured over the 2-day

?END
In equation (8), CARj1,

announcementperiod.
The model (8) is estimated for the convertible bond calls and the
preferredstock calls, and the results are reportedin table 3. The parameters Po and ,31 in equation (8) are estimated by weighted least
squares(WLS), with weights correspondingto the inverse of the standard deviation from the return-generatingmodel. The CAR values in
table 3 that are used to estimate equation (8) are from the market
modelusing postevent parameterestimates. For convertiblebond calls
the sign of the estimated slope coefficient (,) is -.606, significantat
the 1% level (t = -2.551; R2 = .084). This suggests that a 1.0%
abnormaldecline in price upon announcementis followed by a recovery of about .6%. We interpretthese findings as convincing support
for the liquidityhypothesis; that is, stock prices that decline the most

10. Ofer and Natarajan(1987) report significantnegative price performancefor the
year followingconvertiblebond calls, consistentwith the signalingtheory of Harrisand
Raviv (1985). We replicatedtheir analysis using the sample describedin their article,
and, usingbefore-eventestimationas they did, we findthe CAARfor months + 1 through
+ 12 to be - .101 (Z = - 3.307), consistent with their findings. Using after-event estima-

tion we find a CAAR of .032 (Z = .401). Thus, the evidence in supportof negative
signalingvanishes when after-eventestimationis used. See Cowan, Nayar, and Singh
(1990)for a more elaboratetest that establishesthe same finding.
11. We use the date conversionends as the last inclusivedate for the recoveryperiod
because it is precisely identifiable.Ideally, we would use the last day on which liquidation of new shares ends, and this likely occurs after the conversionperiod ends. This
date is not observable;however, we repeatedthe analysisusingarbitrarilychosen terminal dates CED+ 5 and CED+ 20. The point estimates of the CAAR values remainapproximatelythe same.
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TABLE 3

Price Recovery Tests Based on the Model:
CARj,+1,END

=

fo +

+CARj,_,0 + Ej
R

Po

Convertible bonds (N = 111)
Preferred stocks (N = 58)

.002
(.245)
.032
(2.352)

-.606
(-2.551)
.739
(1.751)

.084
.100

NoTE.-The cumulative abnormal return during conversion period = CARJ,+L,END; CARJL-l O
cumulative abnormal return during announcement period. Parameter estimates (X0,X) are determined by weighted least squares. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The CAR value are from
the market model with after-event parameter estimates.

because of convertiblebond calls recover the most by the time conversion ends.
The results for the preferredstock sample are not consistent with
the liquidity hypothesis. For example, using mixed estimation period
parameterswe find I = .599 with a t-statistic of 1.194. The sign is
opposite of that predicted.
Since CARj,+ lEND is measured over a considerableamount of time
for the preferred stock calls (average 26.5 days) and the bond calls
(average27.5 days), the price reboundtests may be distortedby firmspecific developmentsthat occur duringthe notice period. Removal of
observationshaving other Wall Street Journal announcementsduring
the notice period results in a severe reductionin sample size, particularlyin the case of preferredstock calls. Thus, we reporttwo additional
tests using the full samples that may be less subject to distortion by
extremeobservations.The firstemploys Kendall'stest of concordance
between CARj,- 1,0and CARJ + 1,END. The results are similar to those in

table 3. For the bond sample (N = 111), Kendall's "tau" statistic is
- .167 using after-eventestimation, significantlydifferentfrom zero at
the 10%level using a two-tailed test. For the preferredstock sample
(N = 58), the statistic is .117 for after-event estimation and is not
significantlydifferent from zero at the 10%level using a two-tailed
test.
The final test involves rankingthe announcement-periodabnormal
returns (CARj,- O)and groupingthe conversion-periodabnormalreturns (CARj,+?lEND) according to quartiles of the distributions of
CARj,- lo. Stocks that suffer the sharpest announcement-period de-

cline should exhibit the largest recovery. The results are reported in
table 4.
The results in table 4 are generally consistent with those in table
3. Using after-event estimation, convertible bond calls exhibitingthe
sharpestannouncement-periodstock price decline (quartile1) show an
average CAAR over the conversion period of approximately 5%.
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Conversion-Period Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Each
Quartile of Announcement-Period Abnormal Returns

Quartile of CAR,<I,o
Distribution
1 (lowest)
2
3
4 (highest)

Combined Sample
(N = 169)
(1)

Convertible Bonds
(N = 111)
(2)

Convertible
Preferred Stocks
(N = 58)
(3)

.02
.03
.01
.03

.05
.03
.01
.00

-.03
.04
.04
.05

NoTE.-The CAR values are from the market model with after-event parameter estimates.

Those that exhibit the next largest decline (quartile 2) have an average
CAAR over the conversion period of 3%. Those that exhibit the smallest decline (and in some cases positive abnormal returns) are in quartile
4 and the conversion-period CAAR is approximately zero. The results
for convertible preferred stock calls are not consistent with a price
rebound. Thus, the results of this analysis are broadly consistent with
the results in table 3.
V.

Summary and Conclusions

Calls of in-the-money convertible securities are voluntary steps taken
by managers, which have been shown to cause negative common share
price reactions upon announcement. We have argued that the observed
stock price response may be explained in part by a liquidity cost argument similar to that made by Hansen (1988) in the case of rights offers.
Hansen argues that rights offers leave current shareholders with portfolio imbalances that appear to be corrected by selling the new shares.
Concentrated selling pressure forces a temporary price decline, and
this represents an additional cost of marketing new shares. Thus, it is
not clear that rights offerings are truly less costly than general cash
offers; therefore managerial behavior cannot be judged to be irrational.
We have made a similar argument in the case of convertible security
calls, and our argument supplements others such as that made by Harris and Raviv (1985). The evidence is for the most part consistent for
calls of convertible bonds and partially consistent for preferred stock
calls. Calls of both types of securities result in significant negative
announcement effects, regardless of the choice of estimation period.
Using an after-event estimation period for market model parameters,
we find significant positive cumulative average abnormal returns
(CAARs) during the conversion period for the combined sample as
well as the bonds and preferred stocks separately. Using before-event
estimation, which, it has been argued, may be biased, the CAARs
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during the conversion period are positive but not statistically significant.
For the sample of convertible bond calls, stock prices are found to
rebound during the conversion period. But the rebound test fails in
the convertible preferred stock sample, regardless of the choice of
estimationperiod.
For convertible bond calls the weight of the evidence supports the
liquidity-basedexplanation we have set forth. While these findings
cannotrule out other explanationsadvancedand supportedin previous
research, they are clearly consistent with predictionsof the liquiditybased explanation, which do not arise in the other explanations. The
evidence on calls of convertible preferredstocks is mixed, thus our
findingsare not judged fully conclusive for these types of securities.
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